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Communicating Opinion Evidence in the
Forensic Identification Sciences:
Accuracy and Impact
DAWN MCQUISTON-SURRETT* AND MICHAEL J. SAKS**

INTRODUCTION

Forensic identification evidence is presented in criminal trials in
various ways. Experts commonly testify that markings from a crime scene
"match," "are consistent with," or "are similar to" a known person or
object, with the implication being that the defendant is the source of the
evidence. How forensic identification experts express their observations,
how they express their opinion, how they explain what it means, and
what they say it implies, can be expected to have important effects on
what fact finders conclude from the evidence. The aim of this Article is
to consider how the import of the results of forensic identification
examinations can be most accurately and effectively communicated to
trial fact finders.
At least three problems typically confront the communication of
forensic identification findings. First, obstacles make reaching correct
results difficult for any given examination. With the principal exception
of DNA typing, virtually all areas of forensic identification lack
empirically and statistically meaningful measures of the probability that
questioned crime-scene marks and known suspect exemplars share a
common origin. Examiners are, at present, unable to compute random
match probabilities; instead, they assume that the pool of candidates in
the population, which can match as well or better than the known
suspect, equals precisely one. So, if they find two markings to be
indistinguishably alike, they assume that they "share a common origin"
* Assistant Professor of Psychology, Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences Division,
Arizona State University; Ph.D.,, University of Texas at El Paso, 2003.
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"to the exclusion of all others in the world" and that they have therefore
"identified the source."' That such a conclusion is scientifically
impossible does not prevent it from being the dominant paradigm of
twentieth century forensic identification.'
Second is the challenge of communicating the results of forensic
identification examination accurately, without error, exaggeration or
intentionally or unintentionally misleading fact finders. For example,
some experts reporting the results of DNA typing, rather than reporting
the random match probability (RMP) or a likelihood ratio, or some other
indication of the probability associated with the finding that the suspect
DNA and the crime scene DNA shared certain attributes, instead state
that they have "identified" the suspect as being the source of the crime
scene DNA. 3 For another example consider the field of microscopic hair
identification, the one field of traditional forensic identification that
acknowledges its inability to pinpoint the source of questioned hair.' In
their courtroom testimony, however, some hair examiners present
testimony which exaggerates the ability of the technique to zero in on a
source.' These examples indicate inaccurate portrayals of the identifying
power of the examination and its results.
Third, is the problem of reporting accurate results in a way that
enables fact finders to appreciate the meaning of the results and which
enables them to incorporate the forensic identification information with
other identification-relevant trial evidence so that the likelihood is
maximized that correct ultimate conclusions about identity are reached.6
I. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, ii6 (D. Mass. 2005).
2.

See generally

DAVID

J.

BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC

DNA

PROFILES (2005);

Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001);

Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm

Shift in ForensicIdentification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler,
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (208) [hereinafter Saks &
Koehler, Individualization Fallacy]; William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, PsychologicalAspects of
Forensic Identification Evidence, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 31 (Mark
Costanzo et al. eds., 2006).
3. An RMP is the probability that a person or object selected at random from the population
would have the same attributes as the crime scene person or object; a likelihood ratio is the ratio of the
probability of a match if the DNA in the evidence sample and that from the suspect came from the
same person to the probability of a match if they came from different persons. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

4. See

ANDRE MOENSSENS

534, 573

(2d

ed.

2004).

ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES

(4 th ed.

1995).
5. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of
Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF ExPERT
TESTIMONY § 29:37 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2007-20o8 ed.).
6. From the perspective of pure impact, all indications are that forensic identification expert
witnesses are doing very well. It has been suggested that they have been shaped over the years to offer
testimony in terms that are highly influential with fact finders. See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and
Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1069, io80-94 (1998). But what the law expects of witnesses is to convey full
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This Article discusses how fact finders interpret and respond to the
expert testimony of forensic science examiners. Part I is an analysis of the
words to be used when forensic experts report their findings to fact
finders. Parts I and II describe empirical studies we have done which
examine variations in the way that forensic expert testimony has been or
could be presented, in an effort to explore how their testimony can be
made most informative. In Part III, with the help of research exploring
other areas of communication, as well as forensic communication, we try
to discover ways in which the communication of forensic identification
examination results might be improved. In Part IV, we review the
relevant literature on fact finders' interpretation of statistical and
probability evidence as it applies to forensic identification, and the extent
to which opposing experts and cross-examination counter the influence
of an expert's testimony. The overarching goal of the Article is to explore
the communication of forensic identification science in the courtroom in
order to try to ensure that fact finders can make the best and most
accurate use of such evidence.
I. THE MEANING OF WORDS

Various fields of forensic science have begun to promulgate
standards to guide their member practitioners in conducting
examinations, reaching conclusions, and communicating conclusions to
fact finders. Some of these standards involve the words to be used when
reporting findings to fact finders.
For example, the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO)
has developed a set of terms they expect their members to use, along
with definitions of what those terms mean, so that forensic dentists will
know when to use which term in characterizing the conclusions of their
examinations Table i presents those terms and their definitions. But do
those words convey the same meaning to the audience of lay fact finders
(be that a judge or a jury) that they have to the expert putting them
forward? It is important to the integrity of judicial decisions to ensure
that fact finders understand the terminology used by experts in the same
way that the experts intended them.
To find out, we asked 183 undergraduate students to indicate the
meaning of the terms used by forensic odontologists. They were asked to
indicate on a Ioo-point scale what they took the expert's intended
meaning to be in regard to how certain it was that crime scene evidence
originated from the suspect. 8
information honestly, accurately, and usefully, so that fact finders can reach the most nearly accurate
conclusion on those facts and in their verdicts.
7. See generally AM. BD. OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY, BITEMARK STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
(2oo6).
8. In relevant part, the questionnaire stated: The list of terms you will be encountering in this
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I: TESTIMONIAL TERMS AS DEFINED BY THE AMERICAN BOARD
OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY LAYPEOPLE
TABLE

TESTIMONY

OFFICIAL DEFINITION

JURY
INTERPRETATION

Reasonable Scientific
Certainty

Highest order of certainty;
no reasonable probability of error

70.7

Probable

More likely than not; most people could not
leave such a mark

57.4

Consistent (with)

Similarity, but no degree of specificity, like
match; may or may not be

75.6

Match

Some concordance, some similarity, but no
expression of specificity intended; generally
similar but true for large percentage of
population

86.o

The averages of the responses to each of the terms is given in the
third column of Table I. We can see that the term that forensic
odontologists adopted to indicate the strongest connection between
source and crime scene evidence, "reasonable scientific certainty,"
scored a rating of 70.7. Respondents thought this term was a moderately
strong expression of a common source, but it was exceeded by two other
terms. "Consistent with" (a term that was adopted to mean quite a weak
linkage between crime scene evidence and the suspect) is defined as
having "similarity, but no degree of specificity... may or may not" share
a common source. This term was interpreted by laypersons as indicating
a stronger connection (75.6) between evidence and source than
"reasonable scientific certainty." And respondents hear the term
"match," intended to indicate the weakest linkage ("no expression of
specificity intended; generally similar but true for large percentage of
population") as indicating the strongest association (86.o) between crime
scene evidence and its source.9 Finally, "probable," which was intended
to be the term indicating the second strongest association, was
interpreted as reflecting the lowest association (57.4). In all, the terms
indicated to laypersons approximately the opposite of what the experts
intended the terms to mean.
study are used by forensic scientists to express to a jury the degree of confidence they have that a
sample of something taken from a suspect and a sample left at the crime scene by the perpetrator
came from one and the same person. In the questionnaire that follows, we will be asking you to
indicate how much confidence it seems to you is being expressed by each of the different terms that
forensic scientists use.
9. The rules direct odontologists to define "match" when they use it. See AM. BD. OF FORENSIC

ODONToLoGY, supra note 7. Whether many or any in fact follow this guidelines, and whether jurors
successfully change their understanding of the word "match" in response to being told the formal
definition, is unknown.
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These findings suggest a straightforward lesson. Forensic expert
witnesses cannot simply adopt a term, define for themselves what they
wish it to mean, and expect judges and juries to understand what they
mean by it. Of course this is better than the days, not long ago, when
each expert said whatever he or she wished to say, with no formal
guidelines from the community of fellow examiners. But more is needed
if the courts are to be assured that fact finders will understand the terms
to mean what they are intended to mean. What is needed is empirical
testing of the responses to the words. As shown by the study above, such
empirical testing need not be difficult.
The study just described tests individual words or phrases, presented
outside of the context of case facts. Studies of greater richness, context,
and complexity can test reactions to more complete versions of expert
testimony, as described in the next section.
II.

JUDGES' AND JURORS' INTERPRETATIONS OF FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY

Since forensic identification-outside of DNA typing'-has no
random match data to share with fact finders, such experts generally
assert that their examination indicates that the crime scene evidence and
the defendant's sample "share a common source," or some comparable
formulation." The research described in this section is concerned with
the effects of the kind of testimony that is given for the numerous other
forensic identification sciences that have been in existence much longer
than DNA typing has-among them fingerprints, handwriting,
microscopic hair comparison, bitemarks, tire marks, shoe prints, firearms
comparison, and so on. These fields have no scientific basis of the sort
that DNA typing does, and must stand instead on the foundation of the
personal experience and judgment of their practitioners, who must
support their claims in court not with empirical data but with testimonial
assurances. In order to determine the effects of more complete and
candid descriptions of how experts reached their findings, we conducted
two experiments.
In two studies, we tested the effects of different ways of
communicating the same forensic science expert evidence to judges and
to jurors.'2 These included: (I) asserting that the crime scene hair and the
defendant's hair were a "match"; (2) that they were "similar-in-all-

io. DNA typing refers to the methods used to analyze DNA sequences for purposes of
identification.
i i. A number of examples are provided in Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy, supra note
2.
12. See generally Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic
Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear (2oo8) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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microscopic-characteristics"; (3) that they were indistinguishably alike
and the examiner made a subjective estimate of the probability that the
defendant was the source; (4) that they were indistinguishably alike and
the examiner had the data to make an objective estimate of the RMP and
expressed that in a single-probability frame; (5) or that they were
indistinguishably alike and the examiner had data to make an objective
estimate of the RMP and expressed that in a multi-frequency frame. In
addition, we studied two other phenomena: (i) the possible effects of an
examiner giving an opinion on the ultimate issue of identity; and (2)
informing jurors about limitations of the expertise. All of the above can
be considered as falling along a continuum ranging from more fully and
candidly informing fact finders about the nature and process of forensic
identification to giving them little more than conclusory assertions. We
measured fact finders' inferences about the likelihood the defendant was
the source of the crime scene evidence and fact finders' assessment of
their own understanding of the forensic testimony.
We chose microscopic hair identification as the vehicle for exploring
the effects on fact finders' judgments of various ways that forensic
examiners' findings could be presented. Do fact finders draw a different
understanding from the conventional qualitative conclusion ("the hairs
are similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics") versus the examiner's use
of the more culturally weighted term "match"? What happens if instead
of a conventional qualitative conclusion the examiner were to make
explicit the probabilistic nature of the inferences that can be drawn from
the examination by offering the probability of a random match? Does it
make a difference if the RMP is a subjective guesstimate or an objective
calculation based on empirical evidence? We were interested in what
happens when a field moves from no RMPs at all to giving RMPs. Does
it matter whether those RMPs are subjective guesses rather than
objective calculations derived from actual data?
A.

STUDY ONE

Our first study examined the impact on judges and jurors of
variations in the presentation of the forensic expert's findings. First, we
varied the language and concepts by which the expert communicated the
results of his examination. This study involved two groups of
participants: judges and jurors.'3 Participants were presented with a case
summary of a murder trial, the focus of which was the testimony of a
microscopic hair examination expert who asserted in one way or another
that the defendant's hair and the crime scene hair matched."
13. Of the 425 participants, 128 were judges and other judicial officials attending a statewide
judicial conference in Arizona, and 297 were venirepersons (prospective jurors from which a jury is
selected) called for jury duty in Maricopa County Superior Court.
14. The case involved the following details: A convenience store clerk was murdered during the
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In different conditions of our experiment, the expert on microscopic
hair examination presented his findings in one of five different ways: (I)
he characterized the similarity between the crime scene evidence and the
defendant's hair as being a match; (2) he characterized the findings as
showing the hair samples to be similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics;
(3) he gave his subjective probabilityestimate of the RMP; (4) he gave an
objective probability estimate framed as single-probability;or (5) he gave
an objective probability estimate framed as multiple-frequency.5
In half of the conditions described above, the forensic expert's
testimony went no further. In the other half, the expert went on to offer
an ultimate conclusion on identity: "The examiner concluded by offering
the opinion that, based on his examination of the hair in this case, that
the defendant.., was the source" of the sample. Once the examiner
properly shares his underlying findings with the court, the fact finders
know as much as the expert does about the contribution of the hair
evidence to the case; fact finders can connect it to the rest of the evidence
in the case and reach a conclusion about identity and guilt. After reading
over the case summary, participants answered questions concerning the
case.
Results showed that jurors estimated a higher average probability
that the defendant was the source of the hair (68%) than did judges
(48%). Also, participants inferred a higher probability that the defendant
was the source of the crime scene hair when the expert testimony was
presented in the form of "match" (66%), "similar-in-all-microscopiccharacteristics" (68%), or as an objective single-probability (69%), than
when it was presented in a subjective-probability (41%) or objective
multiple-frequency format (45%). When asked how much the hair
evidence contributed to the defendant's guilt (on a seven-point scale
where i = not at all, and 7 = extremely much), judges' mean responses
did not vary as a function of presentation type, whereas jurors found the
expert's findings to be more persuasive when they were presented as an
objective single-probability (5.37) than as a subjective probability (4.42)

course of a robbery. No surveillance video was available. A bystander witnessed the crime but did not
get a good look at the perpetrator's face. A murder weapon was not recovered. Police identified
several potential suspects who agreed to provide a hair sample for comparison with the hair recovered
from a ski mask dropped at the crime scene. This analysis linked one of the suspects to the crime
scene. Thus, the critical evidence in the case was the comparison of the perpetrator's hair from the
crime scene with hair sampled from the defendant.
15. In the subjective probability version, the expert offered a subjective guesstimate concerning
the rarity of the hair left at the crime scene, expressed quantitatively. In the objective singleprobability version, the expert expressed the rarity of the hair left at the crime scene in purely
quantitative (probability) terms framed in such a way to focus on the defendant. In the objective
multiple-frequency version, the expert expressed the rarity of the hair left at the crime scene in purely
quantitative (frequency) terms framed in such a way to focus on the larger population.
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or an objective multiple-frequency (4.5)."6

We also asked our judges and jurors how many people would have
hair that is indistinguishably similar to the hair recovered from the crime
scene in a city of 500,000 people, in light of the expert testimony. The
correct answer to the question is 500, which was readily accessible to
participants presented with quantitative testimony.'7 Nearly half of the
participants in these conditions gave exactly the correct answer of 500:
41% of those in the subjective probability condition and 46% of those in
the objective multi-frequency condition. In the objective singleprobability version of the testimony in which the arithmetic was slightly
harder, 25% of participants gave the correct answer." Those three
conditions resulted in estimates that were a fraction of the size of the
estimates given by participants in the remaining two conditions"match" and "similar in all microscopic" characteristics-in which
guessing was unavoidable since no quantitative information was
provided.
It is interesting to note that participants in the conditions which led
to the highest estimates that the crime scene hair came from the
defendant paradoxically gave the highest estimates of the incidence of
the same hair traits in the reference population. This reinforces the
inference that those two testimonial conditions lead to the least
understanding of the basic concepts of forensic identification while
leading to the highest inculpatory judgments.
While jurors' appraisals of their own understanding of the expert's
testimony (on a seven-point scale) did not vary as a function of
presentation format, judges on average felt that they better understood
the expert evidence when it was presented as an objective multiplefrequency (4.73) than in the "similar in all microscopic" characteristics
condition (3.16). In general, the highest ratings of understanding tended
to result from the more quantitative presentations.
Whether or not the expert gave an opinion on the ultimate issue of
identity had no impact on any of the responses of the participants to the
rest of the evidence.
B.

STUDY Two

Based on the results of our first study, our second study had two
goals. First, it sought to discover whether the understanding and impact
I6. Wherever we state that a difference was found, a test of statistical significance showed a
difference at a probability level of (p < 0.05).
17. Under the objective multi-frequency and subjective probability conditions, the expert stated
that the number would be 3,000 in a city of 3,000,000, so arriving at the proportionate number in a city
of 5oo,ooo was a matter of simple arithmetic.
8. The expert stated that the incidence rate in the population was o.00I, so the participants
would need to multiply 500,000 by o.ooi.
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of forensic identification testimony could be improved by providing
information to the jurors about the limitations of such expertise.
Specifically, jurors learned of the scientific limitations of forensic
identification either through cross-examination by the defense attorney
or by an instruction from the judge. Second, the previous experiment had
failed to find any effect of the forensic expert offering an ultimate
opinion or not, so we sought to make the expert's rendering of an
ultimate opinion more salient. In this study we looked at only three
forms
of presentation:
match
and
similar-in-all-microscopiccharacteristics are the two that are most commonly encountered under
current practice, and subjective probability is the only remotely possible
option for the near future. 9
Participants consisted of 350 venirepersons called for jury duty from
the same county court as in the previous experiment. Participants were
presented with the same basic murder trial used in the first study. One
independent variable involved informing the jury about limitations of
microscopic hair examination. In a control condition, jurors were not
informed about any limitations. In another version, limitations were
brought out on cross-examination." In a third version the limitations
were presented by the judge.'
For the experiment's second independent variable, the expert either
gave no ultimate opinion or the case summary stated: "Asked what
bottom-line conclusion his examination of the hair led to, the forensic
expert stated that the hair found in the ski mask most likely belonged to
the defendant, and therefore it was Aaron Robinson who had been
wearing that ski mask at the robbery."
The third independent variable involved three different forms in
I9. Calculations of objective RMPs or likelihood ratios must wait until the day when sufficient
population data on forensically relevant attributes are gathered so that they can be used in routine
casework.
20. The following was included in the case summary:
The defense attorney then cross-examined the forensic hair examiner. The attorney asked
whether the expert's opinion could be taken to reflect any particular degree of accuracy,
and the witness answered that it could not. The attorney asked whether the assumptions
underlying the expert's opinion had been subjected to thorough scientific testing, and the
witness answered that there had been little scientific testing. The attorney asked whether it
was not true that the expert's opinion amounted to little more than his subjective judgment,
and the expert answered that his conclusions were his subjective judgment informed by his
experience working on previous cases. The attorney asked whether the present case would
become part of that "experience working on previous cases," and the witness acknowledged
that it would.
21. The following was included in the case summary:
As part of instructing the jury, the judge cautioned that, by its nature, the expert testimony
presented in this case lacks any particular degree of accuracy because it has never been
tested scientifically. The conclusions of the expert are little more than his subjective
judgment. The court noted that it nevertheless thought that the testimony had enough value
to be considered by the jury. The court concluded by reminding the jurors that they alone
have the authority and the responsibility to give the expert testimony as much or as little
weight as they feel it deserves.
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which the forensic expert reported his findings: match, similar-in-allmicroscopic-characteristics, and subjective probability (identical to what
was presented in the first study). After reading the case summary
participants answered similar questions as participants in the first study.
Similar to our earlier findings, results from our second study indicate
that participants were most persuaded by the match (74%) and the
similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics versions of the testimony (70%)
in evaluating the probability that the crime-scene hair came from the
defendant. Inferences that the defendant was the source of the crimescene hair were also higher when the expert offered an explicit
conclusion that the defendant was the source (55%) than when he did
not offer this conclusion (34%), but only in the subjective-probability
condition. Why might this be? Perhaps testimony in the form of match
and similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics already elevates jurors'
estimates of source probability, so for them the explicit conclusion has
little to add. But jurors hearing the subjective-probability explanation,
thereby made aware of the guesswork involved in the expert's opinion,
are less sure of what to conclude (reflected in their lower estimates of
source probability). For jurors in this condition the expert's ultimateopinion statement bolsters his testimony, making up for the less
persuasive (because it is a more complete and accurate portrayal of the
nature of the expertise) subjective-probability testimony.
Two additional questions probed the impact of the expert testimony
on inferences that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator. When we
asked the jurors how sure they were that the defendant committed the
crime, on a seven-point scale, jurors in the match (4.50) and similar-inall-microscopic-characteristics (4.32) conditions were on average more
sure than those in the subjective probability condition (3.69). Paralleling
the findings described above, the effect of giving or not giving an explicit
conclusion interacted with the form of testimony such that ultimateopinion testimony increased belief in the defendant's guilt, but only when
the testimony had been given in the subjective-probability form. We
asked jurors about the contribution of the expert evidence to the strength
of the case against the defendant, also on a seven-point scale. Again,
ultimate-opinion testimony made a difference only when subjective
probabilities were given: jurors thought the hair evidence was stronger
when a conclusion was given (4.83) than when it was not given (3-94).
The main lesson of these findings is the unshakeableness of the
traditional forms: match and similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics
produce something of a ceiling effect, which resist moderation by the
presentation of other information.
Jurors rated their understanding of the expert testimony as greater
on average when an explicit opinion on the ultimate issue of identity was
given (5.26) than when no ultimate issue testimony was given (4.90).
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Offering an ultimate opinion on the possible implications of the
examination cannot logically improve a juror's understanding of how the
examination was conducted, but it apparently led jurors to feel that they
better understood it. Most likely, by hearing the expert assert an ultimate
conclusion, the jurors felt less uncertainty about the implications of the
expert's findings, and they transferred that feeling of comfort with a
"verdict" to their sense of their actual understanding of the testimony
and its basis.
Jurors' understanding of the expert evidence as reflected in their
answer to the question of whether a forensic scientist's "conclusion that
the suspect is the person who left the evidence at the crime scene would
be strongest when the size of the pool of others who would match is"
smaller or larger did not vary as a function of any of our independent
variable manipulations. But it is noteworthy that responses to this
question were decidedly in the correct direction: an overall mean of 2.95
on a seven-point scale. By this measure, then, jurors generally seemed to
grasp one of the major concepts underlying forensic identification.
Whether or not jurors were informed about the limitations of
microscopic hair examination on cross-examination or by the judge had
little measurable or meaningful impact on their judgments about the
likelihood that the defendant was the source of the crime-scene hair or
their perceived understanding of the expert's testimony.
C.

IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

Overall, our research generally found that jurors were more
influenced by the expert's testimony than were judges, arriving at higher
probability estimates that the defendant was the source of the crime
scene evidence, and being somewhat more influenced than the judges
were by the form of the expert testimony presented. In examining an
objective measure of understanding of a key concept of forensic
identification (calculating the occurrence rate in the population of crime
scene evidence with a given set of attributes), the jurors were not less
accurate than the judges except in the single-probability condition (which
required more calculations); in that condition 48% of judges reached
exactly correct answers compared to only 17% of jurors. In the two
conditions where judges and jurors could only guess at the population
rate, judges made guesstimates that were far higher than those of the
jurors (which would be consistent with the differences in their respective
estimates of source probability). Neither judges nor jurors were
influenced by whether the expert asserted an explicit opinion on the
ultimate issue of the identity of the defendant as the source of the crime
scene evidence.
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We also found evidence that the two traditional forms22 of
testimony- "match" and "similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics"generally behaved in tandem. They both lead to high source probability
estimates and to high estimates of the population rate of the crime scene
evidence. This finding that these two forms of testimonial expression had
similar effects is noteworthy because "match" is considered by many
microscopic hair examiners to be a misleading characterization of hair
comparison findings, and "similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics" to
be the more enlightened substitute. These traditional forms in which
forensic identification testimony is expressed do not seem to differ in
their impact on jurors or judges, presumably communicating a
comfortingly simple and easily grasped (though not very informative and
presumably misleading) understanding of the basis for the identification
opinion. While these traditional forms of forensic identification
testimony produced the highest estimates of source probability, the most
plausible and candid alternative, namely, the subjective-probability form
of testimony, produces the lowest estimates.
Since most jurors have an exaggerated view of the nature and
capabilities of forensic identification, we expected that information
explaining limitations of the expertise would temper the jurors'
inferences; but the information on limitations had little meaningful effect
on jurors' judgments. We also expected that when an expert gives an
explicit ultimate opinion that a defendant was the source of crime scene
evidence, fact finders would be more persuaded that the defendant was
the source than when the testimony did not include that ultimate
opinion. We found some evidence for this in our second study: explicit
conclusions by the expert increased source-probability estimates and
certainty that the defendant was the perpetrator, but only when the
expert testimony was of the subjective-probability type. The traditional
forms of testimony may be so robust as to create something of a ceiling
effect which renders other testimonial elements, such as an explicit
ultimate opinion, largely superfluous. But where the more modest
subjective-probability testimony is presented, room remains to boost the
fact finders' inferences, and then the assertion of an explicit conclusion
makes a difference. Giving an ultimate opinion on identity also increased
jurors' assessments of their own understanding of the expert testimony.
Such responses, however, are the reason that the common law ultimate
opinion doctrine prohibited experts from opining on ultimate issues: it
22.

These traditional terms have been used to express expert opinion on identification (often

sounding more like fact) for many decades, and continue in use. See generally Saks & Koehler,
Individualization Fallacy, supra note 2. Other familiar and common phrases include: "share a common
source," "identification," and "to the exclusion of all others in the world." Id. It should be said that
"match" is not regarded as appropriate by many or most microscopic hair identification experts, but it

is used by other identification fields, which is why we tested it in these experiments. Id.
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tended to invade areas of decision reserved for fact finders. But modern
rules of evidence have abolished the ultimate issue rule, except regarding
certain psychological issues in criminal cases, where the prohibition lives
on. 3 Perhaps trials would benefit from expanding what remains of the
rule against opining on ultimate issues.
D.

OUR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON THE EXPRESSION OF FORENSIC
ANALYSES

We conducted additional research that tested whether the bare
conclusion of a forensic expert was all that matters to fact finders, or
whether knowing something additional about his background or the
methods he used to conduct his analyses made a difference to the
meaning or acceptability of his conclusions concerning the evidence.4
This study examined whether knowing the simplicity and subjectivity of
the examination process enhances or vitiates fact finders' belief in the
conclusion the expert witness draws.
Participants25 read a case that paralleled the one used in our
experiments described earlier, but it was presented in the form of a
written transcript of the trial instead of a summary. The details of the
case involved a convenience store clerk who was murdered in the course
of a robbery. The transcript revealed that an individual made an
eyewitness identification under poor conditions which led to the arrest
and prosecution of a man who had been found in the neighborhood of
the crime and loosely fit the description. Further, the defendant's brother
testified that they were at his home around the time of the robbery. The
critical evidence is the comparison of hair taken from a ski mask dropped
at the crime scene by the perpetrator with hair sampled from the
defendant. Thus, the focus was on the testimony of a microscopic hair
examination expert who asserted a link between the defendant's hair and
the crime scene.
The study's design consisted of variations in the expert's years of
experience in the field, and variations in the description he gave of the
forensic hair examination process. 6 In each of these the expert gave an
ultimate conclusion as to the identity of the perpetrator based on the
results of his analysis. We also included a control condition which
removed the above four variations wherein the expert presented only a
conclusion without offering any information about his background or the
23. See FED. R. EVID. 704.
24. The study discussed in this and the next three paragraphs describes an honors thesis
conducted under the supervision of the authors of the present Article. See Bianca Connolly, The
Effects of Forensic Science Expert Testimony: How Little Is Enough? (2006) (unpublished honors
thesis. Arizona State University) (on file with authors).
25. Participants included 152 Arizona State University undergraduate students.
26. The expert expressed having either one or twenty-three years of experience, and then he
either provided a brief description of the hair examination process or he did not.
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process of his examination. It seemed possible that jurors would be
prepared to trust the findings of the more experienced expert, especially
when they learned that the process depended entirely on the subjective
judgment of the expert. But it was also possible that jurors would treat all
versions of the testimony equally because the expert's bottom line was
the most meaningful piece of his assertions.
When we asked participants to evaluate the expert, the assertion of
years of experience of that expert had little impact. However, jurors who
heard him describe the hair examination process (especially compared to
those who heard only the bare conclusion with no mention of the process
or the expert's credentials) rated the expert as doing a significantly better
job, being more scientific, being more convincing, and facilitating a better
understanding of his analyses. But their judgments on the actual evidence
(i.e., likelihood/probability/certainty that the hair came from the
defendant, helpfulness of the evidence in the case against the defendant)
and verdict did not vary as a function of hearing the examination process
information. Thus, while differences between conditions occurred for
jurors' beliefs that they were more impressed by the expert who
explained the hair examination process to them, the data do not suggest
that they were actually more influenced by that expert. And what the
jurors learned about the hair examination process should not have been
very comforting to them: it should have revealed how little science there
was behind his analysis and that his conclusion was based on nothing
more than an intuitive, subjective guesstimate of whether the hairs share
a common source.
These studies examined the extent to which fact finders' judgments
are affected by the various ways a forensic examiner can describe his
findings. The next section explores the parallels that can be drawn
between the field of forensic identification and other fields which seek
effective communication of important information to decision makers.
III. RESEARCH ON COMMUNICATING RISK
If forensic identification testimony can be viewed as testimony which
conveys information about a "risk"-that an accused might not be the
perpetrator, that a real perpetrator might still be on the loose, or that the
perpetrator is the defendant who might escape liability if his identity is
not recognized-then research on risk communication from other fields
might provide relevant insights for the presentation of forensic
identification evidence.
Clinical psychologists and other mental health professionals are
increasingly called upon to offer expert testimony to the courts in which
they estimate the future dangerousness of a violent offender. The clinical
assessment of violence risk and the degree of accuracy of such
conclusions are well-researched topics in the psychological literature, but
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how efficacious the communication of that risk is to others has received
less attention.27 A similar line of inquiry lies within the fields of medicine
and health communication regarding how best to present patients with
risk information relevant to various diseases and treatment options.2"
Within the context of the legal system there is an obvious need for the
assessment of future risk in various domains to be communicated to the
courts in a way that is clear, concise, complete, and usable; the assessor's
evaluation must be "fully accessible" to those who are then responsible
for making decisions in the courtroom. 9 The research-and much of its
findings-on risk communication drawn from these fields lends itself to
some of the work we have done in examining expert testimony proffered
in the forensic identification sciences and how the content and results of
forensic analyses can best be expressed to fact finders.
Risk communication can be thought of as the connection between
the assessment of risk and what decisions should be made based on that
assessment. One article appropriately argued that even the most accurate
of assessments of violence risk will be useless to decision makers if its
conclusions are not communicated effectively.30 How can risk-relevant
information be delivered in such a way that maximizes decision makers'
understanding? This is an important question for any field in which
predictions are made and consequences based on the perceived level of
risk follow.
For instance, in evaluating the possible future dangerousness of a
violent offender, decisions based on risk assessments can involve
determining appropriate intervention strategies, civil commitment or
sentencing, possible harm to others,3 and so on. In the healthcare field,
patients make decisions about screening tests, treatments, the
effectiveness of certain treatments, and so on, based on their perception
of the associated risks and benefits explained to them by healthcare
professionals. In our field of interest-communicating the results of
forensic examinations-decisions involve determining the extent of a link
between crime scene material and samples taken from an individual or
object, ultimately leading to an assessment of culpability.
Numerical or statistical assessments are often used to convey a level
of future risk, expressed generally using a probability format or a
27.

See generally John Monahan, Violence Prediction:The Past Twenty Years and the Next Twenty

Years, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 107 (1996)."

28. See, e.g., Angela Fagerlin et al., Making Numbers Matter: Present and Future Research in Risk
HEALTH BEHAV. S47, S47 (2007).
29. Robert F. Schopp, Communicating Risk Assessments: Accuracy, Efficacy, and Responsibility,
51Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 939, 939 (I996).
3o. Kirk Heilbrun et al., Violence Risk Communication: Implications for Research, Policy, and
Practice,I HEALTH RISK & SOC'Y 91, 103 (999).
31. That is, a possible duty to warn third parties about a patient's dangerousness. See Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,351 (1976).

Communication, 31 AM. J.
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frequency format. For example, a clinician might express the risk of a
person committing future violence as "Person X has a 30% chance of
hurting someone in the future" (a probability) or as "Of ioo persons like
X, we might expect thirty to hurt someone in the future" (a frequency);
these conclusions are numerically identical. Unfortunately, ample
evidence from the research literature suggests that most people have
poor quantitative and statistical reasoning skills both in general and,
specifically, in legal settings.3" Concerning the use of probabilities and
frequencies to convey an examination's results or an assessment, studies
consistently find that decision makers reach different judgments when
they are presented with information in a frequency format versus the
same information communicated in probability terms. Specifically, the
presentation of quantitative information as frequencies leads people to
estimate greater likelihoods than if they receive information in the form
of a probability.33
In the communication of violence risk, the data show that framing a
risk assessment as a frequency leads decision makers to view the person
of interest as being at a greater risk of harming others than when that
risk is expressed as probability.34 For example, Slovic et al. presented
clinicians with case summaries describing at-risk patients and asked them
to judge the likelihood of future harm to others within six months after
hospitalization discharge.35 A major finding consistent across their three
studies was that patients were judged by psychologists and psychiatrists
as posing a greater risk to others when the likelihood of committing a
harmful act was framed as a frequency rather than as a probability,
regardless of the type of response scale used." Even a tutorial given to
participants that was designed to assist them in their interpretation of the
quantitative information had no impact on the consistency of their
judgments and, specifically, did not reduce the apparent biasing effects of
the frequency versus the probability formats.37 Monahan et al. report
similar findings concerning the effect of frequency versus probability
formats among a group of forensic psychologists. 8
These effects might be due to the use of an "affect heuristic" in
which the interpretation of a frequentistic assessment ("Of ioo persons
32. See, e.g., Jonathan J.Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?,
25 Law
& HUM. BEHAV. 493, 494 (2001).
33. Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using
Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 271, 289 (2000).

34. Id.at 272-73.
35. Id.at 285-88.
36. Id.at 289-9o.
37. Id.at 289-2.
38. John Monahan et al., Communicating Violence Risk: Frequency Formats, Vivid Outcomes,and
Forensic Settings, I INT'L J.FORENSIC

MENTAL HEALTH 121, 126 (2002).
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like X, we might expect thirty to hurt someone in the future") may evoke
frightening images of violent mental patients, leading the person being
assessed to be viewed as a high risk to society, versus a less threatening
image of one patient based on a probabilistic assessment ("Person X has
a 30% chance of hurting someone in the future").39 Koehler argues that
this explanation can be thought of as a special case of "exemplar cueing,"
in that the tendency to generate exemplars of others who have the
potential to commit violence results from the presentation of
frequencies, leading to a more conservative risk management approach
compared with that of a probabilistic estimate."
In Koehler's research on the evaluation of DNA match statistics,
exemplar cueing theory applies nicely to the frequency versus probability
presentation effects he observed. 4' He presented laypeople with case
summaries that varied the presentation format of the likelihood of a
DNA match as either a frequency (e.g., the likelihood of a match if the
suspect is not the source is one in i,ooo) or a probability (e.g., the
likelihood of a match if the suspect is not the source is o.i%). Across
several studies he found that the frequency format was far less persuasive
than the probability format, resulting in lower-rated guilt judgments.4"
These results suggest that the frequentistic presentation led people to
estimate a greater likelihood of a DNA match only by coincidence,
resulting in lower ratings of guilt, thus paralleling the literature described
above that finds a greater perceived likelihood of risk based on
frequency assessments.43 Results of our research examining these format
effects based on the presentation of other types of forensic evidence are
consistent with these findings.'
As an alternative to the presentation of a risk assessment in purely
quantitative terms, some suggest the use of categorical risk
communication that would use a classification format to convey the
likelihood of future risk, based on the number and severity of risk factors
present, and the like.45 For example, in a study examining methods of risk
communication, psychologists and psychiatrists preferred the use of
categories to express risk ("low" vs. "moderate" vs. "high" risk of

39. See generally Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Benefit, 25 RISK ANALYSIS io85 (1994); Melissa L. Finucane et al., The

Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk and Benefits, 13 J.

BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1

(1999); Paul Slovic

et al., supra note 33.
40. Koehler, supra note 32, at 495-98.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Slovic et al., supra note 33.
44. See generally McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 12.
45. Kirk Heilbrun et al., Expert Approaches to Communicating Violence Risk,
BEHAV. 137, 140-41 (2OOO).

24 LAW

& HUM.
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violence) over the use of numerical probabilities. 6 Other research is
consistent with this finding, demonstrating clinicians' preference against
the use of probabilities to express an assessment of future risk."
Arguably, an integration of numerical/probabilistic plus categorical risk
assessments could in fact provide the most comprehensive set of
information to aid decision makers.
A related line of inquiry has explored laypersons' perceptions of
mental health practitioners' expert testimony when predictions of risk
are based on clinical opinion (subjective judgments) versus actuarial
instruments (objective judgments) 8 Opinion testimony is that which is
based on the clinician's experience in practice, whereas prediction
originating from an actuarial assessment is based on scientifically
established risk factors shown to predict violence among groups of
offenders (e.g., prior record of violence, criminal history, psychopathic
assessment).49 Although assessments based on actuarial methods are
often more accurate at predicting future violence than are clinical
judgments," the research described below finds that laypeople in fact are
more persuaded by clinical opinion expert testimony than actuarial
expert testimony when it comes to predicting dangerousness.
In a study examining the judgments of mock jurors, Krauss and Sales
presented videotaped simulated testimony that manipulated the type of
expert testimony presented (clinical vs. actuarial), along with various
adversarial procedures (cross-examination, competing experts) designed
to safeguard biasing testimony.5 ' Their results showed that participants
were more influenced by clinical opinion testimony." Mock jurors were
more persuaded in their ratings of future dangerousness by the clinical
testimony compared with the actuarial testimony both prior to and
following implementation of any adversarial procedure, and found the
two forms of testimony to be equally scientific and credible. 3
Some parallels between these findings and our own research on fact
finders' evaluation of forensic science expert testimony can be drawn. In
our research, when we asked participants to indicate the likelihood of a
forensic match between crime scene material and that taken from a
46. Id.

47. See generally Kirk Heilbrun et al., Risk Communication: Clinicians' Reported Approaches and
Perceived Values, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 397 (1999); Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of
Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007 (1993).
48. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinicaland Scientific Expert Testimony on
JurorDecision-Makingin CapitalSentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267, 269 (2001).
49. Id. at 271-73.
50. Randy Borum, Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 945, 950-52 (1996).

51. Krauss & Sales, supra note 48, at 282-85.
52. See id. at 289-99.

53. Id.
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defendant, participants were often more influenced by the forensic
expert's subjective (clinical), qualitative (nonquantified) judgment
describing the methods he used to arrive at his conclusion of a match,
compared to a more objective and quantitative description of his
analysis.'
More generally, the findings on risk communication from the health
and mental health fields likely find their parallels in forensic science
expert testimony. The conclusions of examiners in all areas of forensic
identification other than DNA typing reach their conclusions on the basis
of subjective guesstimations (clinical rather than actuarial), they present
their opinions in nonquantitative, usually categorical, terms, and by all
indications laypersons are generally quite persuaded by their testimony.5
We next turn to a broad discussion of fact finders' decision making
concerning expert witnesses. Our review describes research examining
the impact of experts' conclusions which are often framed in quantitative
terms on fact finders' reasoning, the expression of forensic analyses and
conclusions as framework evidence, and whether the legal safeguards
designed to counter the influence of experts' testimony have a real
impact in the courtroom.
IV. EXPERT WITNESSES AND DECISION MAKING BY FACT FINDERS
A considerable amount of research on jurors' (and sometimes
judges') understanding of and reactions to expert testimony has been
conducted in contexts other than the conventional, low-technology
forensic science on which this paper has been focused. In this section we
review what we regard as some of the most informative of that literature
for the purposes of our topic.
A.

STATISTICAL AND PROBABILITY EVIDENCE

One implication of our own research 6 is that trial fact finding might
be better served if forensic scientists would testify more fully and could
provide an empirical, perhaps even quantitative, basis for their
testimony. After all, that is how so much valuable scientific data are
often conveyed to the makers of important decisions. But as suggested by
some of our research, fact finders are not always sensitive to such
differences in the testimony presented. 7
Relatedly, several lines of research suggest that statistical and

54. See generally McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 12.
55. See, e.g., State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2oo4) (Thorne, J., concurring)
("In essence, we have adopted a cultural assumption that a government representative's assertion that
a defendant's fingerprint was found at a crime scene is an infallible fact, and not merely the examiner's
opinion.").
56. See generally McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 12.
57. Id.
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probability evidence present special difficulties for fact finders . In
general, probability evidence tends to be underutilized by fact finders
and they tend not to be sensitive to variations in some important
parameters, 9 though the pattern of findings is not simple. Changes in
features of the trial process and in the format by which statistical
evidence is presented produce changes in fact finders' understanding and
use of the evidence.
One of the most relevant sets of studies is by Thompson and his
colleagues on the "Prosecutor's Fallacy" and the "Defense Attorney's
Fallacy."" These can occur when an expert opines that a match exists
between crime scene evidence and evidence known to originate with the
defendant, and data are offered so that the fact finders have some basis
for evaluating the likelihood that the two samples shared a common
source, namely, the defendant. As an example, a long blond hair is found
at a crime scene and a suspect with long blond hair is arrested. The
significance of the long blond hair depends, to an important degree, on
how common or how rare that trait is in the population; such evidence
would be more probative in China than it would be in Sweden.
In the Prosecutor's Fallacy, fact finders mistakenly think that the
frequency of the trait in the population tells them something about the
probability of guilt or innocence of the particular defendant." For
example, if fact finders learn that a trait shared by the perpetrator and
the defendant occur in 2% of the population, many of them infer that the
chance that the defendant is not the source is only 2%. In the Defense
58. See generally David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic
Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'v 75 (i9I); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to
Evaluate StatisticalEvidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989).
59. See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, i5 LAW & Soc'y REV. 124 (i98i); infra notes 6o-69. William C. Thompson and
Simon A. Cole raise an important criticism of some of the jury simulation findings:
[S]ubjects' apparent conservatism in these early studies may have been due, in part, to the
inadequacy of the Bayesian models. In these models the likelihood ratio depended on a
single variable-the random match probability. Although these likelihood ratios may have
reflected the diagnostic value of the forensic match, they failed to capture any uncertainty
about its reliability. In other words, the Bayesian models against which subjects' judgments
were compared implicitly assumed the forensic tests were error-free. This is a big
assumption and one that subjects probably did not share.
Thompson & Cole, supra note 2, at 53-54. Later and better studies find less underutilization (greater
"accuracy"), but fact finders still fall short of the Bayesian norm. Bear in mind, also, that in
circumstances where laypersons underutilize probability data, so does everyone else, including
statisticians and scientists. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). The implication of much of this kind of research (outside of jury
studies) is that even professional decision makers are prone to reaching incorrect conclusions if they
rely on their intuition rather than making use of explicit computational decision aids.
6o. See Thompson, supra note 58; William C. Thompson & Edward Schumann, Interpretationof
Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor'sFallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, II
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
61. Forensic science experts themselves sometimes make this error. See Thompson, supra note 58,
at 26-27.
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Attorney's Fallacy, fact finders might realize that a population rate of
2%

would mean that in a city of, say, i,ooo,ooo people,

20,000

would

have the trait, and mistakenly regard the evidence as having virtually no
probative value on the question of identity.
62 The first error overvalues the
evidence and the second undervalues it.
Other studies have found that when mock jurors are given the same
statistical evidence just described, but in the context of conditional
probabilities (mock jurors were told that if the defendant were innocent
there was a 2% chance that his trait would match the perpetrator's),
more of them committed the Prosecutor's Fallacy and fewer committed
the Defense Attorney's Fallacy (8%). 63 When the trait frequencies were
given as a percentage and an incidence rate (2% of people have hair that
would be indistinguishable, and in a city of i,ooo,ooo there would be
approximately 20,000 such individuals), then fewer jurors committed the
Prosecutor's Fallacy but more committed the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy. 64
Other research varied the frequency of the trait in the population
(5%, I%, 0.I% or no probability information at all). 6' The research
found that jurors' estimates "failed to make fine distinctions between
probability estimates that were mildly incriminating, moderately
incriminating, and strongly incriminating." 66 The mean estimate of guilt,
however, was higher in groups that heard the probabilistic evidence than
in the control group that heard no data, implying that when no data are
given or can be given, fact finders implicitly substitute their own
guesstimates of the likelihoods. 6
In a study in which counsel on both sides made invalid arguments on
behalf of the two fallacies, most jurors thought that either the
prosecutor's fallacy (29%) or the defense attorney's fallacy (68%) was
correct, while only 22% of the jurors concluded that both arguments
were incorrect. Moreover, jurors' erroneous decisions suggest that "it is
easy to talk people into using inappropriate judgmental strategies to

62. Eight percent of jurors or fewer make these errors. See Jane Goodman, Jurors'
Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 384 (1992);
Thompson & Schumann, supra note 60, at 174.
63. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 60, at 174.
64. Id.
65. Goodman, supra note 62, at 371.
66. Id. at 371-72. In the 5 % condition, the mean estimate of guilt was 40%, in the i % condition it
was 45%, and in the o.i% condition it was 47%. Id. at 371. Goodman compares the student answers to
the answers provided by the Bayes' Theorem. Using the conviction rate of the control group (where
no probabilistic evidence was presented) as the prior estimate of guilt, compared to a Bayesian
rational juror, the mock jurors in each group tended to underutilize the blood type evidence. Id. at 372.
The discrepancy was greatest in the groups in which the frequency probabilities were the most
incriminating. Id. at 373.
67. Id. at 371.
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evaluate [this kind of] evidence." ' When jurors were permitted to discuss
the evidence and arguments, as they would in deliberation, the estimates
of probability of guilt and their conviction rates dropped. The exception
to this were those exposed to the fallacious arguments for the
prosecutor's fallacy, but this was the case only when the defense did not
counter that with an argument in favor of the defense attorney's fallacy.
Typically, fact finders give insufficient weight to population rate data
that have been offered to clarify the meaning of a "match." 69 They do
increase their estimates of the probability of guilt in response to the
evidence, but not as much as Bayes' Theorem suggests their guilt
judgments ought to be adjusted. °
Research by Koehler has shown, on the other hand, that how exactly
one presents mathematically equivalent evidence can have quite
dramatic effects on the inferences jurors draw from the data.7' Mentioned
above, and replicated in our own experiments, Koehler's experiments
tested the effects of varying the target and the frame of DNA match
statistics.72 When describing the chance of a coincidental match to an
innocent person, the focus (the target) of the presentation can be on the
defendant in the courtroom or, say, the metropolitan population. And
the incidence rate of the trait in the population can be expressed
("framed") as RMP or as frequency.73 To take the two most different
combinations: An example of a multi-target frequency frame would be to
inform fact finders that, although the defendant's DNA matches the
crime scene DNA, this would be true also for one in one million people
in the city where the crime occurred.74 An example of a single-target
probability frame would be to inform fact finders that the chance that the
suspect would match by coincidence if he were not the source is
o.oooo0i. 75 As Koehler notes, these two kinds of reports are
mathematically identical, but psychologically different. 6 Upon hearing
the evidence by way of a single-target probability frame, fact finders are
far more likely to infer that the defendant was the source of the DNA
than when the same information is communicated by way of a multitarget frequency frame.77 Differences as a function of the incidence rate
68. Thompson, supra note 58, at 33.
69. Koehler, supra note 32, at 493.
70. Id. at 504; Thompson, supra note 58, at 33.
71. Koehler, supra note 32, at 509.

Id. at 497-98.
73. Id. at 497.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 498. In one of the experiments, where the incidence rate in the population was one in
1,000, 54% of mock jurors hearing the single-target probability frame thought the defendant was more
than 99% likely to be the source of the crime scene DNA, while the same evidence presented through
72.
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in the population (one in a thousand versus one in a million versus one in
a billion), however, had only modest impact on jurors' judgments 8
When jurors are made aware of the laboratory's error rate in
determining whether a questioned and a known were indistinguishably
alike, or were thought to share a common source, how do fact finders
combine such information with the incidence rate of the trait in the
population and what effect do both together have on their estimations of
the probability of identification? For example, a juror who initially
estimates the probability of the defendant's guilt to be only io%, and
who then receives new evidence indicating that the defendant and
perpetrator have the same blood type, which occurs in i% of the
population, and that the false-positive error rate of matching blood types
is also i %, should, according to the Bayesian model, arrive at a new
combined probability of guilt of about 85%. If the incidence rate and
false-positive rate are both 5%, then the Bayesian model indicates the
revised estimate of probability of guilt should be only 53%. The
difference between i% and 5% may seem small at first blush, but the
impact on the probative value of the match between the defendant and
perpetrator is substantial. But to reach the proper result, a fact finder
must evaluate two probabilities at once: population incidence rate and
laboratory error rate.
In the first of Thompson's experiments testing fact finders' ability to
evaluate the evidence described above, mock jurors were given several
different sets of evidence to examine, so that they could compare cases
with stronger and weaker evidence."' They accurately determined that
the evidence was most incriminating where both probabilities were low,
least incriminating where both probabilities were high, and of
intermediate incriminating value where one factor was high and the
other low. In the next experiment, experimenters gave participants only
one case to evaluate. Presented in this way, which is more like the way
jurors actually encounter cases, fact finders were insensitive to the
differences in the probativeness of the evidence."' In a third experiment
they were again presented with the evidence of one case but now were
allowed to deliberate in groups (like juries) about the evidence."' With
deliberation, jurors were still insensitive to the differences in the
evidence-by finding the evidence quite probative whether it was or was
a multi-target frequency frame led 36% of jurors to conclude that there was less than a 1% chance that
the defendant was the source of the DNA. Id. at 506.
78. Id. at 508.
79. Thompson, supra note 58, at 36.
8o. Id. at 30-31. This is what researchers call a within-subjects design.
8I. Id. at 34. This is what researchers call a between-subjects design. Now the comparisons are
between groups of jurors receiving one kind of evidence compared to another.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 37.
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not. In the strong evidence condition jurors reached estimates of guilt
(66%) that came very close to the Bayesian calculation (64%), while
jurors in the weak evidence condition greatly overestimated (65%) the
real value (22%) of the weak evidence.
A way out of the dilemma of either withholding from jurors
meaningful data or giving them data with which they might lead
themselves astray is to find ways to present such evidence in a manner
that will facilitate correct use. Nance & Morris, using a large number of
jurors drawn from an Illinois jury pool, compared jurors who were
presented with entirely nonquantitative DNA match findings in the
context of a criminal case, to jurors who were given quantitative data in
one of several different forms to see which best aided them in assessing
the probativeness of the DNA match. 85 Jurors were given data on the
frequency in the population of the DNA sequence at issue and data on
the frequency of false positive laboratory errors.86 The population
frequency data were given in the form of a frequency (one in 40,000), or
as a frequency plus as a likelihood ratio (40,000 times more likely to
match if the accused is the source of the crime scene sample than if he
were not), or as a frequency plus a likelihood ratio plus a chart that
mapped how such a likelihood ratio should change people's judgments of
the probability of guilt depending on how incriminating they thought the
other evidence in the case was.8 ' The evidence on laboratory error was
presented either in unquantified form ("there is a chance of lab error");
or quantified lab error ("one false positive in every thousand tests"); or
given, in addition, with instruction on the proper way to combine
laboratory error with the population frequency evidence. Jurors made
best use of the random match population data when they were provided
with the frequency data, the likelihood ratio, and the chart; they made
the least effective use of the evidence when presented with only the
frequency data. Information about laboratory error had no appreciable
impact on fact finders' judgments. 8
Although underutilization errors are made in regard to unemotional
issues in calm contexts, emotional arousal probably contributes to the
problem of undervaluation of probabilistic evidence. Sunstein refers to
this as "probability neglect."' ' When strong emotions are involved,
84. Id.
85. See Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understandingof DNA Evidence: An Empirical
Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match
Probability,34 J. LEGAL STUD.395, 401-04 (2005).
86. Id. at 402-03.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 409-10.
89. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,
112 YALE L.J. 61, 61-76 (2002).
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people pay less attention to information and apparently even less
attention to probability.' ° Large scale differences in probability that
should matter seem to matter little at all in an individual's decision.
B.

FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE

Forensic identification evidence is a specie of "framework"
evidence. Framework evidence consists of background information on
persons or events not parties to the case at bar, but who arguably are
similar to, or in a situation similar to, that of the relevant party.9 ' Studies
of framework evidence have typically involved such issues as eyewitness
unreliability, posttraumatic stress disorders, or cross-cultural differences
in the meaning of behavior.9" The purpose of the testimony is to provide
the fact finder with general information about the context in which
contested adjudicative facts occurred in order to help the fact finder
interpret the contested case-specific facts.93
Thus, forensic identification evidence informs (or should inform) a
fact finder of the relationship between characteristics of objects in the
relevant universe of objects which are not at issue on the present case,
which would then inform them about the attributes of the evidence at
issue in the present case, and it would be up to the jury to apply the
general knowledge to the particulars at issue in the case. If that were
done when forensic identification evidence were presented, and if the
existing research in those rather different areas were applicable, the
research on "social framework" expert testimony would suggest that fact
finders give considerable weight to such evidence.'
In some kinds of cases, illustrated by the topics in the studies cited in
the preceding footnote, experts disclaim any ability to opine on the
o

9 . For a general discussion of the role of emotion in jury decision making, see Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005),
and Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (2ooi).
I
9 . Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law,
73 VA. L. REV. 559, 572-73 (t987).
92. Id. (explicating cases and studies involving these and other examples of such "framework"
uses of evidence).
93. Though less obvious than in cases where framework evidence is proffered, these are the same
kinds of facts contained in all sorts of scientific studies on which all kinds of practitioners rely: one
understands the specific (this patient, this bridge, this vehicle, this bee hive, this forest, etc.) mostly
through one's understanding of many others of the same category that have been studied earlier. In
other trial contexts, this background knowledge is what makes the expert an expert, and it is a major
(often unspoken) foundation on which the expert's opinion stands.

94. See generally Natalie J. Gabora et al., The Effects of Complainant Age and Expert
Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 103 (1993);
Regina A. Schuller & Sara Rzepa, Expert Testimony Pertaining to Battered Woman Syndrome: Its
Impact on Jurors' Decisions, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (2002); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (20oI); Neil Vidmar & Regina A.
Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133
(1989).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:11 59

implications of the general knowledge to the case at bar. They offer the
scientific findings, and let the fact finders apply them to the specifics of
the case.95 Other experts are willing to tell the fact finders what
conclusion the general knowledge leads to in the specific case being
litigated. The law has been inconsistent concerning when it will allow
which kind of expert testimony. 6 The abolition of the bar against
ultimate issue opinions in most situations would seem to have opened the
door to the case-specific conclusions, which the research shows will have
a greater impact on the jury. Experts on forensic identification usually
give an ultimate opinion on identity, rather than to offer the jury
framework evidence plus "clinical" information on the features of the
evidence involved in the instant case. Thus, framework phenomena do
not have an opportunity to play themselves out in testimony by forensic
identification scientists.
C.

WELLS' "BLUE

Bus"

STUDY

Gary Wells set out to test a number of explanations for the famous
Blue Bus Problem. The usual finding, in research subjects as well as
judicial opinions, is that people hesitate to make liability decisions when
the only available evidence consists of naked statistics.7 Legal scholars
tend to debate the legal justification for and the philosophical
underpinnings of such hesitancy. Wells attacked the problem as a matter
of cognition, empirically testable.
The basic scenario is that a plaintiff, who is color blind, is suing the
Blue Bus Company for killing her dog. The sort of evidence she has to
offer is naked statistics: county transportation officials testify that there
are only two bus companies in the county, the Blue Bus Company and
the Grey Bus Company, and that the Blue Bus Company owns 8o% of
all the buses and generates 8o% of all bus traffic on the road. Faced with
such evidence, most people (judges, college students, MBAs, and others)
make approximately correct subjective probability estimates of the
likelihood that it was a Blue Bus Company bus that ran over the dog, but
only a fraction of them are willing to find the Blue Bus Company liable.
By contrast, a witness who testifies that he thinks he saw the Blue Bus do
it, even though the witness is correct only 8o%
of the time, is capable of
9
leading judges and students to find liability. 8
The following scenarios are most relevant to our line of research.

i

95. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 9 , at 559.

96. Id.
97. Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J.
PERSONAIrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 739, 739 I992). Wells uses the term "naked statistical evidence" to

mean "probabilities that are not case specific in the sense that the evidence was not created by the
event in question but rather existed prior to or independently of the particular case being tried." Id.
98. Id. at 744.
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One body of evidence consisted of tire tread patterns from the accident
scene that are then compared to the buses in the Blue and Gray company
fleets. An expert explains that 8o% of the buses that had tire treads that
matched the pattern left at the accident scene were owned by the Blue
Bus Company while 20% were owned by the Gray Bus Company. In a
slightly different version, the expert adds that, based on the tire tread
evidence, "he believed that the bus that ran over Mrs. Prob's dog was a
Blue Bus Company bus." With this one small addition, judges as well as
students were willing to find against the defendant. Judges and students
receiving both versions reach the same subjective probability estimates of
the likelihood that the Blue Bus Company is the offender. But verdicts
against the Blue Bus Company were rendered only in the presence of the
latter testimony.
These findings would seem to suggest that an important reason that
jurors so often accept the liability implications of forensic identification
testimony is that examiners are permitted to make conclusory assertions
based on their own subjective judgment. According to Wells's theory, by
permitting witnesses to give case-specific, fact-to-evidence (rather than
requiring evidence-to-fact
testimony), findings of liability become far
99
more common.
D.

OPPOSING EXPERTS AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

The Krauss and Sales research, discussed above, is one of a few
studies that directly assesses the ability of opposing experts and crossexamination to counter the influence of an expert's testimony.
Diamond and her colleagues examined this proposition within the
context of a criminal case."° The stimulus involved the testimony of an
expert modeled after a Dr. James Grigson, a psychiatrist who regularly
testified for the prosecution in death penalty cases on the issue of future
dangerousness. ' Typically, Dr. Grigson would testify that the defendant
constituted an ongoing danger. For example, in Barefoot v. Estelle he
stated that there was a "one-hundred percent and absolute chance" the
defendant would commit future crimes of violence."°2 In the Diamond et
al. experiment, the jury, drawn from the Cook County, Illinois jury pool,
watched a seventy-five minute videotape of a death penalty hearing
involving an armed robbery and murder of a stranger whom the

99. Id. at 746.
ioo. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 35 (1996).

ioi. Id. at 36. In Texas, where Dr. Grigson most frequently testified, the jury could not impose the
death sentence unless they concluded that the defendant was likely to "commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.07I(2)(b)(i) (Vernon 2002).
102. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919 (1983).
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defendant robbed in order to buy beer.'"
In three conditions of the experiment, the jurors heard the
prosecution expert state that he had diagnosed the defendant as a
sociopath, based solely on an examination of records of prior court
proceedings, pre-sentence reports, and prison records." The expert
concluded that the defendant was "certain to kill again" if not executed.
The expert asserted that he had extensive prior experience in making
such predictions and he was generally accurate.
In the first, "weak cross-examination" condition, the defense only
brought out the fact that the expert usually testified for the state, but did
not challenge the future dangerousness prediction. 5 In the second,
"strong cross-examination" condition, the defense added to the cross in
the weak condition by pointing out at length that the expert's prediction
of future killing was inconsistent with prior research and that the expert
has not employed the standard methods for diagnosing future
dangerousness. The expert admitted on the stand that the best scientific
literature indicates that two-thirds of dangerousness predictions prove to
be incorrect. The cross-examination also brought out the fact that the
expert had never published his findings in peer-reviewed journals. The
expert responded that he was focused on clinical diagnosis, not
publication, and that he was confident he was correct. In the third,
"strong cross-examination plus defense expert" condition, the defense
lawyer conducted the same cross as in the strong-cross condition. In
addition, a defense expert, who was also a psychiatrist, testified that the
defendant coped reasonably well but on rare occasions excessive
drinking interacted with a personality disorder to produce violence. The
defense expert testified that predictions about future violence could not
be made with any certainty, but that in his view the likelihood of future
similar violence was not great and the defendant was a good candidate
for an alcohol abuse program.
In a fourth, "control" condition, the prosecution expert made a
realistic prediction, basically agreeing with the defense expert that
predictions of future dangerousness are accurate only about one-third of
the time, but warned about the defendant's potential for future violence.
The cross-examination was identical to the cross in the first condition.
The dependent variables 16 in the study included a question about
the persuasiveness of the state's expert, the jury verdict preference
(death or life) and a verdict confidence index. The first condition, with a
103. Diamond et al., supra note ioo, at 19-2o. The next three paragraphs summarize the method
section of the article.
104. Id. at 38.
105. Id. It is not unusual for lawyers to devote a large portion of their cross-examination of experts
to the issues of the expert's qualifications and potential sources of bias.
io6. Id. at 38-42.

May 2008]

COMMUNICATING OPINIONEVIDENCE

strong prediction of future dangerousness, no opposing experts and a
weak cross should produce the highest percentage of death penalty
verdicts. If cross-examination is an effective prophylactic against
unreliable testimony, the second condition should produce lower
persuasiveness scores and a lower percentage of death penalty verdicts.
And the combination of a powerful cross and an opposing expert should
produce still lower persuasiveness scores and even fewer death penalty
verdicts. Ideally, this version would produce jury judgments
indistinguishable from the fourth version in which the expert reported a
one in three chance of being correct.
In fact neither the "strong cross" nor the "strong cross plus the
opposing expert" had a significant effect on plaintiff expert
persuasiveness, percentage of juries opting for death, or verdict
confidence." For example, in the weak cross condition 47% of the juries
gave a death verdict, in the strong cross condition 51% recommended
death, and in the strong cross plus opposing expert 50% recommended
death. The only condition with a different result was in the fourth,
"control" condition where the plaintiff expert testified that predictions
were wrong two-thirds of the time. In this condition, 39% of the juries
recommended the death penalty. °8 Diamond and Casper note that one
possible interpretation of these results is that the jurors simply did not
care about future dangerousness." ° However, based on evidence from
their deliberations, this is not the case. Most juries explicitly discussed
the issue and there was a strong correlation between jurors' predictions
of future dangerousness and verdict preferences." ' However, jury
estimates of future dangerousness if released did not vary significantly
across the three conditions where the plaintiff's expert testified the
defendant would kill again."'
This one study does not establish the inefficacy of "battles of the
experts" or cross-examination. Diamond and Casper offer the possibility
that this testimony was particularly difficult to overcome because it was
consistent with beliefs and expectations already held by the jurors. " '
However, the results are consistent with another study, by Kovera and
colleagues."3 They varied the strength of the defense's cross-examination
of an expert. Although appropriate tests revealed that jurors were
107. Id. The results described in this paragraph summarize the "Results" section of Diamond et al.

io8. Id. at 40.
to9. Id.

i Io.
ld.at 43.
iI. Id. at 42.
112. Id. at 53. There is research supporting the proposition that mock jurors hold strong beliefs
concerning the ability of clinicians to predict future dangerousness and that they overestimate clinician
accuracy. See Daniel Krauss & Bruce Sales, supra note 48, at 276.
113. See Margaret Kovera et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of Expert
Evidence Type and Cross-Examination,18 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 653, 653 0994).
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sensitive to the relative strength of the cross-examination of the expert,
this did not affect participants' perceptions of the quality of the evidence
nor did it affect verdict." 4 This result was replicated in a second study by
the same authors." 5 These results should give pause to anyone who
believes that the traditional tools of the adversarial process will always
undo the adverse effects of weak expert testimony.
CONCLUSION

The subjective nature of the state of the art of most fields of forensic
identification is generally not well understood. Our research findings
show that the traditional forms of testimony (similar-in-all-microscopiccharacteristics, match, and equivalent formulations) were the most
damaging to the defense, leading judges and jurors alike to high
estimates of source probability. Presumably this is not a coincidence, but
the result of decades of "practice" in seeing what leads to the most
acquiescence by fact finders. These forms of testimony do not, however,
lead to the greatest understanding of what forensic identification does
and means.
One might have expected an explication of the examination process,
emphasizing the guesswork involved, would have a sobering effect on
fact finders, but it appears instead to lead fact finders to be more
impressed by the examination. Similarly, since most jurors begin with an
exaggerated view of the nature and capabilities of forensic identification,
one might expect that information explicitly informing fact finders about
the limitations of the expertise would temper the jurors' inferences. Such
information had little effect on jurors' judgments.
Since fact finders, especially jurors, tended to yield to comforting
certainties of expression about the evidence being testified to, one might
also expect that when an expert gives an explicit ultimate opinion that a
defendant was the source of crime scene evidence, fact finders would be
more persuaded that the defendant was the source than when the
testimony did not include that ultimate opinion. Ultimate opinion
testimony only increased jurors' assessments of their own understanding
of the expert testimony.
Both important similarities and important differences are found in
the patterns of response by judges and jurors. Jurors were more
influenced by the expert's testimony than judges, arriving at higher
probability estimates that the defendant was the source of the crime
scene evidence. Judges appear to be less affected than jurors by subtle
variations in the form of presentation. Both judges and jurors are more
114. Id. at 669.
115. See Margaret Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: The Effects of JurorGender
and Evidence Quality on JurorDecisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
362, 369-71 (1999).

May 2008]

COMMUNICATING OPINION EVIDENCE

comfortable converting subjective probability evidence into findings of
liability when the expert asserts a personal interpretation of a conclusion
to which the data point. Neither judges nor jurors were influenced by
whether the expert asserted an explicit opinion on the ultimate issue of
the identity of the defendant as the source of the crime scene evidence.
Lay fact finders of most kinds generally have difficulty understanding
statistical, and especially probability, data, and underutilize such
information.
Clearly, the language employed by forensic experts affects the
inferences fact finders draw, sometimes producing conclusions in the
minds of fact finders quite different from what the expert witnesses
purportedly intend. More subtly, even slight variations in how an expert's
testimony is structured or the words used can significantly affect the
understanding fact finders' draw from it. And, unfortunately, crossexamination and the use of opposing experts do not appear to effectively
counter expert testimony, regardless of the logical vulnerability of the
initial expert testimony.
The findings on risk communication from the health and mental
health fields seem to find their parallels in the communication of forensic
identification science expert testimony. The conclusions of examiners in
all areas of forensic identification other than DNA typing reach their
conclusions on the basis of subjective guesstimations (arguably clinical
rather than actuarial), and they present their opinions in nonquantitative,
qualitative, usually categorical, terms. These seem to be the very
attributes of risk communication (and forensic psychological testimony)
that have more influence on decision makers. The paradox is that
systematic, data-based, quantitative evidence might be viewed by
genuine scientists as the best way to support and express information, but
those are less persuasive (to lay fact finders and perhaps to all kinds of
fact finders) kinds of testimony than testimony which scientists hold in
higher regard-and which all rational decision makers would, in an ideal
world, would also hold in higher regard.
Much remains to be learned about how fact finders understand and
respond to the expert testimony of examiners in the various forensic
individualization fields, and how their testimony can be made most
informative. The patterns that have emerged from the studies that have
been conducted thus far both advance our understanding of fact finder
decisions concerning forensic identification science and can serve to
guide the path of future research.
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